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Lowell Smitht and Russell Randleff
The Journal recently printed a lengthy article entitled Beyond the New
Deal. Coal and the Clean Air Act,' which attacks the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency's 1979 air pollution standard for new coal-fired power
plants.2 The authors state that "the agency action is so inept that some of
the nation's most populous areas will enjoy a worse environment than
would have resulted if the new policy had never been put into effect." 3
The authors also charge that this "extraordinary agency decision.., will
cost the public tens of billions of dollars to achieve environmental goals
that could be reached more cheaply, more quickly, and more surely by
other means."' The article confidently advised the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, then considering challenges
to the EPA's standard,' that the agency's decision to promulgate the stan-
dard suggests "a strong remand" to the EPA.' The court of appeals has
now upheld the agency's new power plant standard in all respects,' but
* This response letter was written by Smith'and Randle in their private capacity. No official
support or endorsement by the Environmental Protection Agency or any other agency of the Federal
Government is intended or should be inferred.
t Director, Program Integration and Policy Staff, Office of Research and Development, U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.
"t Former staff member, Program Integration and Policy Staff, Office of Research and Develop-
ment, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.
1. Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466
(1980) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,580-624 (1979) (codified in 40 C.F.R. § 60.43a (1980)).
3. P. 1469.
4. Id.
5. Sierra Club v. Costle, No. 79-1565 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 29, 1981). Environmentalists challenged
the standard as too lax and utilities contended, like Ackerman and Hassler, that the standard was too
strict. See id., slip op. at 7. Unlike Ackerman and Hassler, however, the utilities did not argue that
the statutory requirements "could be satisfied by burning untreated low sulfur coal alone, without
utilizing scrubbers or other 'add-on' control technology." See id. at 19-20 n.38 (comparing contentions
of parties to those of Ackerman and Hassler).
The case was argued on September 22, 1980. Ackerman and Hassler's article appeared in early
September. This comment was submitted to the Journal in late March 1981.
6. P. 1566.
7. The three-judge panel affirmed the standard as reasonable in all respects. Judge Wald re-
viewed and rejected the challenges to the standard in a thorough 253-page opinion, in which Judge
Ginsburg concurred; Judge Robb concurred in the result. No party sought rehearing by the panel,
rehearing en banc, or certiorari review by the Supreme Court. See Docket Sheet, Sierra Club v.
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the issue remains timely because Congress and the Executive are consider-
ing amendments to the- Clean Air Act.'
The standard is controversial and, as another recent study observes, it
"has been criticized by environmental organizations that believe that it is
not sufficiently strict, and by the utility industry and some academic com-
mentators because it discriminates against the use of low-sulfur coal and
less costly (although less effective) control techniques." 9 The Ackerman
and Hassler article is one of the more provocative and original in the
debate over the standard. It makes important points about the way the
EPA and Congress reach environmental decisions, a process that could be
significantly improved. As a process critique, the article makes a
contribution.
The authors' substantive argument for reversal of the 1979 standard is
seriously flawed, however, both by methodological problems and by ques-
tionable factual assertions. The article offers a detailed technocratic analy-
sis of the disadvantages of "forced scrubbing." 10 Yet the 1979 standard
adopted by the EPA, to which the authors devote almost no attention,
achieves substantially greater environmental gains at lower cost than
"forced scrubbing." The authors also ignore important related environ-
mental standards and fail to discuss leading judicial decisions that bear on
the 1979 standard. In addition, the authors contend that coal cleaning at
all old plants and the use of other control options would achieve "bigger
gains sooner and more cheaply"" than would forced scrubbing at new
ones. The best currently available data, however, suggest otherwise.
I. Methods and Style
The authors' stated approach is to examine the problems of power
plant air pollution as if they were an "ideal New Deal agency charged
with the task of selecting the most sensible means to congressionally ap-
proved ends-protecting health and environmental quality by cleaning up
the air."' 2 They suggest that the most sensible means are those that can be
justified by good cost-benefit analysis." Urging reversal of the 1979 stan-
Costle, No. 79-1565 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 29, 1981).
8. See, e.g., 11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2062, 2091, 2191, 2193 (1981); 12 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 65,
275, 347 (1981) (discussions of possible amendments).
9. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON AIR QUALITY, To BREATHE CLEAN AIR 3.7-3.8 (1981). This re-
port cites Ackerman and Hassler's article to support this point.
10. Pp. 1521-36. Although the authors sometimes use the term "forced scrubbing" in a more
general sense to refer to the mandatory use of scrubber technology, see pp. 1488-89, they use figures
based on the EPA's proposed 1978 standard in their criticisms of "forced scrubbing," see, e.g., p.
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dard, they conclude that "[c]riticism is properly due the agency for failing
to relate its scrubbing decision to what the Act plainly requires: cleaning
the air in a cost-effective way that yields real environmental benefits."' 4
These statements strongly suggest that the authors base their substantive
criticism of the agency's 1979 standard upon a careful cost-benefit analysis
of the standard and alternatives to it," and that such analysis clearly dem-
onstrates that the 1979 standard is less cost effective. No such analysis
exists. The authors did not conduct one, nor do they cite one in their
article. 16
The article suggests that the EPA failed to consider the regulation of
power plant location as a method of air pollution control.'7 The authors
completely ignore the agency's statutorily mandated "prevention of signifi-
cant deterioration" (PSD) program, which requires a highly detailed sit-
ing and air quality analysis 8 for each new power plant and for every
major modification to an old one. 9 The 1979 new source performance
standard (NSPS) the authors criticize is simply one part of the overall
statutory program, and is in fact the basis for control technology require-
ments under the PSD program. 0 The authors' narrow focus on "forced
scrubbing" misses that important fact. The failure to discuss the PSD
program is misleading to the reader, and leads the authors to discuss dis-
persion strategies of highly questionable legality or practicality.2'
The legal analysis is flawed by similar omissions. Nowhere do the au-
thors discuss the District of Columbia Circuit's "rigorous standard of re-
view under section 111," under which the court engages in an in-depth
review of the technical basis for the agency's choice of a new plant pollu-
tion standard. The leading case applying that standard, National Lime
Association v. EPA, was decided months before the publication of the arti-
14. P. 1565.
15. The authors mention the following alternatives as preferable to "forced scrubbing" and, ap-
parently, preferable to the EPA's 1979 standard: (1) the use of physically cleaned coal by old plants
and low sulfur coal by new plants, pp. 1523-25; (2) the use of "market-like schemes" to decide among
various control options, p. 1525; (3) the use of a "low ceiling" standard, uniform across the country,
pp. 1526, 1544-45; (4) the use of "judicious site selection" and other siting alternatives, pp. 1530-31,
1534, 1538.
16. The agency analysis they cite shows that the 1979 standard is as cost effective as the "low-
ceiling" option within the margin of uncertainty. The cost of the two alternatives is almost the same,
and the difference of 200,000 tons in emission reductions is less than the margin of error in the model.
See ICF INC., THE FINAL SET OF ANALYSES OF ALTERNATIVE NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STAN-
DARDS FOR NEW COAL-FIRED POWERPLANTS 6 (june 1979) [hereinafter cited as I2F REPORT].
17. P. 1538.
18. Clean Air Act § 165(e)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(e)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
19. Id. § 169(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(C); see id. § 111(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4).
20. Id. § 169(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). When the EPA promulgated the 1979 standard, it ex-
plained that its models did not take into account the costs and benefits of the additional control mea-
sures required under PSD, including siting alternatives, because these depend on many site-specific
factors that cannot be determined in advance. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33,580, 33,605 (1979).
21. See pp. 1409-10 infra.
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cle. 22 This is a serious omission, because only the District of Columbia
Circuit has the authority under the Clean Air Act to review standards
promulgated under section 111.11 Similarly, the authors ignore statutory
limitations and existing case law when they argue that courts should en-
dorse the EPA's efforts to permit polluters to offset pollution control re-
quirements between old and new plants. They ignore a key issue under
section 111 and the PSD provisions of the Act: what constitutes a modifi-
cation to an old source. 4 They also ignore the two leading District of
Columbia Circuit cases discussing that issue, Alabama Power Co. v.
Costle (I) and Alabama Power Co. v. Costle (1I).25 In addition, the au-
thors' suggestion that courts allow the EPA to regulate existing plants
conflicts with their "principle of textual priority,12 because section 111
regulates only "new" or "modified" sources and not existing sources.
Finally, Ackerman and Hassler fail to discuss air pollution control
strategies and technology in dispassionate terms. Christening "forced
scrubbing" as an environmental "peril," 28 scrubbers as "technological
symbols," 29 and low sulfur coal as the "natural" method of compliance0
may make for livelier reading, but it does little to advance the readers'
understanding of these complex strategies and technologies.
II. Substantive Analysis
The authors' substantive support is no match for their strong rhetoric.
Although the article contains a number of assertions that we consider
questionable, we shall focus on five that are central to their argument for
reversal of the 1979 standard: first, the standard is environmentally
counterproductive; second, a compliance strategy based on coal cleaning
and low sulfur coal is far easier to enforce than one based on scrubbers;
third, coal cleaning is far cheaper, faster, and more reliable than scrub-
22. National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (decided May 19). The article
was published in early September 1980.
23. Clean Air Act § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
24. New source performance standards and PSD requirements regulate only new or modified
sources, not existing ones. Id. §§ 111(a)(2), (4), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(2), (4) (NSPS); id. §§ 165,
169(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7479(2)(0) (PSD).
25. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle (II), 636 F.2d 323, 399-400 (D.C. Cir. 1979, published with
slight modifications 1980); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle (I), 606 F.2d 1068, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Judge Leventhal joined in both opinions. The authors' failure to discuss the holdings concerning
modifications in these two cases is a curious omission in light of their heavy reliance on Judge
Leventhal's earlier decisions. See pp. 1558-59, 1568 n.404.
26. Pp. 1559-61.
27. See Clean Air Act §§ 111(a)(2), (4), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(2), (4) (Supp. 1111979) (defining
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bing and has no environmental drawbacks; fourth, scrubbers on new
power plants will not effectively protect visibility in the West because of
the air pollution emitted by Western smelters; and fifth, practical disper-
sion strategies can be used as an alternative to continuous emission
control.
A. The Merits of the 1979 Standard
A key count in the article's indictment of the 1979 standard is the asser-
tion that the standard will make the environment worse in the areas east
of the Mississippi suffering from acid rain.3 The authors, however,
devote very little attention to the standard actually adopted by the EPA in
1979.32 Instead, they provide an extensive critique of "full scrubbing,"
that is, the use of wet scrubbers to remove ninety percent of the sulfur
dioxide from power plant emissions.3 The authors are attacking a straw
man; "full scrubbing" was proposed by the agency in 1978, but it was not
adopted by the agency in 1979.2" The more flexible 1979 standard allows
power plants that burn low sulfur coal to remove a lower percentage of
their sulfur dioxide emissions, thereby enlarging the number of technolog-
ical methods-including the use of dry scrubbers-available to comply
with the regulation. In no place in the proposed or adopted regulations
is the use of any specific technology required, although the use of a num-
ber of new technologies36 and anthracite coal" is deliberately encouraged.
There are considerable differences between the initial proposal and the
adopted standard, as might be expected after nine months of hotly con-
tested notice-and-comment rulemaking and several million dollars of anal-
ysis by EPA personnel and respected consultants.
The authors present virtually no information about the emission reduc-
tions and environmental benefits projected to result from the 1979 stan-
dard that they criticize so strongly.3 In fact, as shown by the EPA studies
31. P. 1469.
32. See pp. 1553, 1554 & nn.368-73, 1555 & nn.374-76.
33. See p. 1524 & n.234; ICF REPORT, supra note 16, at 4-5 (option M in ICF analysis); id. at
C-VIII-21 (figures for alternative standard 'of 90% removal with washing credit; 1.0 pounds SOfJ
MBTU ceiling; wet scrubbing). The 90% removal figure is an annual average. Id. at 4.
34. For projections based on the promulgated standard, see ICF REPORT, supra note 16, at C-III-
21. The report clearly distinguishes between the two scenarios. See id. at 3-5.
35. See EPA, REVIEW OF NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR COAL FIRED UTILITY
BOILERS: PHASE THREE REPORT 181-82 (1979) (EPA Pub. No. 600/7-79-215) (relaxation to permit
dry scrubbing) [hereinafter cited as TEKNEKRON REPORT].
36. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.45a (1980). The commercial demonstration permit program allows 15,000
megawatts of new coal-fired generating capacity-about 7% of new capacity to be built by 1995-to
meet more flexible pollution control requirements with the use of four promising control technologies
and fuel pretreatment methods.
37. Changes were made in the final standard to promote the burning of low sulfur, low ash, high
heat content anthracite coal from Pennsylvania. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33,580, 33,590 (1979).
38. The authors report that "some [unnamed] experts" claim that the data base on dry scrubbing
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on which the authors rely, the 1979 standard results in substantially
greater emission reductions east of the Mississippi than the 1978 proposal
would have achieved. 9 In addition, compared to the 1971 standard, the
1979 standard reduces emissions in every area of the country, including
the East, the South, and the Midwest, 0 which are all areas that contrib-
is weak. See p. 1555. Yet utilities have begun to build three full-scale plants that incorporate dry
scrubbing technology. See TEKNEKRON REPORT, supra note 35, at 193 (boilers will come into opera-
tion in 1981 and 1982). Additionally, full-page advertisements are now appearing in trade publica-
tions drawing attention to the commercial availability and attractiveness of this new technology. See,
e.g., POLLUTION CONTROL ENGINEERING, Jan. 1981, at 15.
Large savings are projected to result from the use of dry scrubbing over the wet scrubbing required
by the agency's initial proposal. Under the 1979 standard as adopted, the total capital costs between
1983 and 2000 are $48 billion, $34 billion cheaper than the 1978 standard the EPA proposed. See id.
at 182. Moreover, the 1979 dry scrubbing standard is not substantially more expensive than the 1971
standard using wet scrubbing, with capital costs of $48 billion rather than $40 billion between 1983
and 2000. Id.
39. In the regions east of the Mississippi, the emission reductions are almost double those under
the 1978 standard. Compare ICF REPORT, supra note 16, at C-I1-21 with id. at C-VIII-21
(1,664,000 tons versus 958,000 tons). The difference is especially striking in the East North Central
states (the Midwest in the authors' discussion), where a 171,000-ton emission increase under the
proposed standard, see pp. 1524, 1535-36; ICF REPORT, supra note 16, at C-VIII-21, becomes a
186,000-ton emission decrease under the promulgated 1979 standard using dry scrubbing cost figures,
id. at C-111-21.
Only by making the heroic engineering assumption that dry scrubbing costs will rapidly increase to
wet scrubbing levels could the authors hope to justify their claim that emissions would increase
slightly in the Midwest under the 1979 standard. See id. at C-IV-21. The ICF Report shows, how-
ever, that compliance with the agency's 1979 standard using dry scrubbing will be 32%-S1.2 bil-
lion-less costly per year than if wet scrubbing were used to meet the same standard. Id. at 2. The
authors do not cite a single agency or utility industry report or expert opinion that would support the
use of wet scrubbing cost figures to analyze the emission effects of the 1979 standard. In fact, more
recent cost estimates continue to support the projected cost savings from dry scrubbing. See ICF INC.,
INTERIM RESULTS OF ACID RAIN MITIGATION STUDY, app. III, at I1-11 (1981) (substantial cost
savings of dry scrubbing over wet scrubbing in meeting equivalent standard) [hereinafter cited as
ARMS REPORT].
40.
Comparison of 1971 Standard and 1979 Standard




East North Central 185.9 3
East South Central 423.1 12
West North Central 155.4 6
West South Central 918.7 35
Mountain & Pacific 629.7 37
National Total 3,367.7 14
Sources: ICF REPORT, supra note 16, at C-III-3a-3c (1979 standard); id. at C-I-3a-3c (1971 stan-
dard); id. at C-III-21 (reduction advantages of 1979 standard over 1971 standard).
This table shows the advantages of the EPA's 1979 standard over the 1971 standard. The year for
comparison is 1995, the same year the authors used in their analysis. See p. 1524.
The trend shown by the ICF figures is confirmed by the agency's other major study of the likely
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ute to and suffer from acid rain." It is thus hard to see how the authors'
attack on the 1979 standard is consistent with their concern for acid rain
in these regions.
B. Enforcement Realities
The article contends that "a universal scrubbing requirement threatens
to overwhelm the existing enforcement system.' 2 "[Oince a realistic view
of enforcement is taken," they assert, the EPA would find that "forced
scrubbing may make the sulfate problem worse, not better,"' 3 and "might
dramatically worsen the East's sulfate problem."'" These enforcement dif-
ficulties are peculiar to scrubbers, the argument runs. Monitoring is much
easier, according to the authors, when power plants meet the 1971 stan-
dard "the natural way" with low sulfur coal or cleaned coal, allowing
enforcement officials "to collect chunklets of coal for laboratory
analysis.""5
Continuous monitors, as required by the new standard, enjoy a statisti-
cal advantage over the fuel-sampling techniques favored by the authors.
The monitors measure emissions from power plants far more frequently
than is possible with small grab samples ("chunklets" of coal) from utility
coal shipments.4 6 It is basic statistics that accuracy increases with sam-
effects of the 1979 standard, a study the authors ignored. TEKNEKRON REPORT, supra note 35, at 187.
Lowell Smith was the project officer managing this report. See id. at i.
41. Proper analysis of acid rain control strategies requires careful examination of emissions for
the entire eastern half of the North American continent. See United States-Canada Memorandum of
Intent on Transboundary Air Pollution: Atmospheric Modelling Interim Report 4-1 to 4-4 (Feb.
1981) (relevant area of concern from modeling perspective) (on file with Yale Law Journal); The
LRTAP Problem in North America: a preliminary overview 33 (Oct. 1979) (report prepared by
United States-Canada research consultation group) (map of sulfur dioxide emissions in eastern North
America) (on file with Yale Law Journal). The authors focused too narrowly on emissions from the
Midwest, see p. 1524, apparently on the assumption that only these emissions were important in acid
rain problems. See p. 1524 n.235 (explaining away large emission reductions in Eastern, Southern,
and Gulf states as insignificant). This assumption places the authors in the absurd position of arguing
that their claimed 3% emission increase from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois warrants reversal of the 1979
standard, despite a 12% decrease from other states east of the Mississippi. These other states include
Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania, some of the largest coal producing and con-
suming states in the country. In fact, however, the 1979 standard, assuming the use of dry scrubbing,





46. Continuous monitors tend for this reason to give a far more accurate picture of actual emis-
sions, even if the authors' gloomy view of continuous monitoring capabilities is correct. Interview with
James Kilgroe, EPA Industrial Environmental Research Laboratory, Research Triangle Park, North
Carolina (Mar. 11, 1981). Mr. Kilgroe is the coal-cleaning expert on whom the authors relied. See
pp. 1481 n.55, 1523 nn.228-31, 1524 n.232.
Moreover, continuous monitoring of flue-gas sulfur dioxide is likely to improve substantially as
mechanical problems with these devices are solved. On the other hand, fuel-sampling accuracy is
likely to remain limited by the mathematical requirements and economic realities of sampling fre-
quency, until monitors are developed that can continuously monitor the sulfur and ash level of coal.
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pling frequency, especially when sampling values differ widely, as is the
case with coal sulfur content. 7
Continuous monitors enjoy another important advantage over fuel sam-
pling. They give an instantaneous, "real-time" picture of actual emissions,
information which permits rapid correction of problems." In contrast,
present fuel-sampling methods rely on daily average or ninety-day average
fuel sulfur values and entail lags in data compilation.49
But the real difficulty with the authors' strategy may be human rather
than technical: the use of low sulfur coal gives utilities and coal companies
greater incentives to weaken or to violate standards. Where scrubbers are
used, the utilities must continue to pay for them once they are built,
whether or not they are used. 0 Sources in industry and the Justice De-
partment confirm that once scrubbers are in place, utilities make conscien-
tious efforts to stay in compliance and do not try to weaken the standard."s
By the same token, when low sulfur coal is the compliance strategy, sur-
reptitious use of higher sulfur coal can benefit utilities by lowering fuel
costs substantially 2 and can benefit coal companies by increasing their
profits.53
Interview with Kilgroe, supra.
47. See TEKNEKRON REPORT, supra note 35, at 6 (showing effects of coal sulfur variability and
standard averaging time on "effective ceiling"); id. at 140 (range of sulfur contents in Western low
sulfur coal from same seams); id. at 199 (definition of relative standard deviation of sulfur content in
coal).
48. Present standards require a complete sampling cycle and analysis every fifteen minutes. 40
C.F.R. § 60.13(c)(1)(iii) (1980); id. § 60 app. B, at 460. The advantage of this real-time monitoring
picture will be limited, however, unless utilities are also required to relay the information continu-
ously to plant operators. At present, agency regulations do not require continuous monitoring or fuel-
sampling data to be provided to plant operators.
49. Fuel sampling at coal-cleaning plants under current standards results in an average value for
coal sulfur content for the lot of coal burned by the power plant over a 90-day period. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 60.344 app. A, at 431, 1 2.1.2 (1980). Although this period can be shortened, the large lot size
normally produced by coal-cleaning plants will tend to limit the scope for improvement. Interview
with Kilgroe, supra note 46. Under current standards, sampling at the power plant results in an
average sulfur value for coal the plant burns over a 24-hour period. 40 C.F.R. § 60.344 app. A, at
432, 3.3 (1980). Smaller lot sizes at the power plant make the shorter averaging period practical.
Interview with Kilgroe, supra note 46.
50. See, e.g., ARMS REPORT, supra note 39, app. III, at 111-12 (annualized capital costs substan-
tially higher than operation and maintenance costs).
51. Interview with Russell Klier, PEDCo Environmental Specialists, in Cincinnati, Ohio (Jan. 6,
1977); interview with attorney, Pollution Control Section, Lands and Natural Resources Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 11, 1981).
52. Typically, low sulfur coal costs 20% more than high sulfur coal. See ARMS REPORT, supra
note 39, app. III, at 111-13 (listing delivered prices by sulfur content). Fuel costs are generally the
largest operating expense of a coal-burning plant.
53. According to sources in EPA regional offices who are responsible for the enforcement of sulfur
dioxide emission limitations, coal companies occasionally try to substitute cheaper, higher sulfur coal
for the more expensive, lower sulfur coal the utilities are paying for. Interviews with a confidential
source, one of ten EPA Regional Enforcement Offices (June 1980).
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C. Coal Cleaning Capabilities
The authors criticize the agency for failing to give sufficient considera-
tion to coal cleaning, the physical removal of sulfur from coal before it is
burned. 4 This method has significant promise in controlling some sulfur
dioxide emissions, but it is not as cheap, as easy, or as rapid as the au-
thors indicate, nor does their sketchy data support their inflated claims.
1. Costs
No direct evidence is cited to support the authors' claim that universal
coal cleaning at old plants would result in significant savings over the
scrubbing required at new plants under the 1979 standard."5 Currently
available data indicate otherwise. An interagency study by the TVA and
the EPA clearly shows that, over a wide range of sulfur content, scrub-
bing and physical coal cleaning impose substantially similar costs for the
removal of a pound of sulfur from an average coal of a given sulfur con-
tent. 6 In addition, figures generated by James Kilgroe, the EPA coal-
cleaning expert on whom they rely, show that coal-cleaning costs range
from $200 to $2800 per ton of sulfur dioxide removed. 7 If new power
plants in these regions are required to install scrubbers and burn local
coal, current estimates indicate that the costs would range between $330
and $1030 per ton of sulfur dioxide removed. Moreover, whether coal
cleaning or scrubbing is used, the cost per ton of sulfur dioxide removed
tends to be lowest when sulfur content is highest, because the capital costs
are distributed over greater emission reductions. 9 Consequently, when
54. Pp. 1523-25.
55. The claim of massive cost savings is made repeatedly. See, e.g., pp. 1481, 1523, 1525.
56. EPA & TVA, EVALUATION OF PHYSICAL/CHEMICAL COAL CLEANING AND FLUE GAS DESUL-
FURIZATION at xxiii (Nov. 1979) (EPA Pub. No. EPA-600/7-79-250) (annual revenue requirements
for coal-cleaning processes and scrubbing).
57. Coal-cleaning costs for the Midwest and Northern Appalachian states (where sulfur content is
generally high) ranges between $200 and $400 per ton of sulfur dioxide removed. See J. Kilgroe, Cost
Effectiveness of Coal Cleaning in Four Regions (Aug. 1980) (unpublished EPA analysis) (table 15)
(on file with Yale Law Journal). In contrast, cleaning costs in the Southern Appalachians-eastern
Kentucky, Tennessee, southern West Virginia, and Virginia-range between $700 and $2800 per ton.
Id. All these figures exclude tonnage and cost figures for metallurgical coal.
58. Costs range between $333 per ton of sulfur dioxide removed for a high sulfur coal typical of
the Midwest (6.6 pounds SO,/MBTU heat content) and $1,031 per ton for a lower sulfur coal
typical of the coals available in the Southern Appalachians (1.66 pounds SOJMBTU). ARMS RE-
PORT, supra note 39, app. 111, at 111-13.
The figures reported here actually overstate scrubber costs at new plants. They are based on the
ICF Report figures available to the authors, adjusted for inflation to 1980 dollars, and raised by 30%
in order to give current costs for retrofitting large existing power plants, a more expensive proposition
generally than installing scrubbers at new plants. ARMS REPORT, supra note 39, app. III, at 111-5.
59. See TEKNEKRON REPORT, supra note 35, at 41 (cost effectiveness of scrubbing increases with
sulfur content of coal burned). The cost effectiveness of coal cleaning tends to be more complicated,




coal cleaning is cheap, scrubbing tends to be; when scrubbing is expensive,
coal cleaning tends to be either expensive or impossible.60
These cost figures are all quite tentative, but they do show that coal
cleaning does not enjoy the pronounced advantages claimed by the au-
thors, and that scrubbing may be more cost effective in many cases. 6I Al-
though these cost figures need considerable refinement-now in pro-
gress-the estimates reported here are far better supported than those
used by the authors to advocate reversal of the 1979 standard."2
2. Speed
The article contends that coal cleaning would achieve faster emission
reductions than the 1979 standard.63 The evidence for these claims is thin:
an estimate of the time needed to build one coal-cleaning plant, and a
projection that one to two million tons of additional emission reductions
could have been achieved by 1985 if the EPA had launched a crash pro-
gram in 1980.64 This estimate did not include the time needed for the
EPA to develop, to propose, to promulgate, and to implement regulations
that would require universal washing practices, a process that could take
more than five years. 5
60. Thus the costs of cleaning higher sulfur coal from the Midwest and Northern Appalachians
range between $200 and $400 per ton of SO2 removed; the cost of scrubbing emissions from a plant
burning a coal typical of the region (6.6 pounds SO/MBTU) is $333 per ton of SO2 removed.
ARMS REPORT, supra note 39, app. 11, at 111-13. Scrubbing the lowest sulfur coal is most expensive
per pound of sulfur removed. However, coal cleaning may be an ineffective control technique for these
coals, because Western low sulfur coals are very low in pyritic sulfur and therefore not susceptible to
cleaning. Plants burning low sulfur coal from the Southern Appalachians will generally find scrub-
bing more cost effective than cleaning. Interview with Kilgroe, supra note 46.
61. Cost ranges for coal cleaning and scrubbing for each region tend to be fairly close. See notes
57, 58, & 60 supra. The authors' failure to account for the differences between the regions lead them
to compare cleaning costs on Eastern coals, see J. Kilgroe, supra note 57 (table 15), with a range of
scrubber costs that includes the scrubbing of low sulfur Western coals, p. 1523 & n.231, much more
expensive per ton of SO, removed than the scrubbing of Eastern or Midwestern coals. See ARMS
REPORT, supra note 39, app. III, at 111-13 ($2000 per ton for wet scrubbing 0.8 pounds SO 2/MBTU
coal; $1504 for dry scrubbing); c. note 57 supra (cost of scrubbing higher sulfur coal). Little coal
cleaning is done in the West, in part because the process has little capacity for removing sulfur from
Western coals. See note 60 supra.
62. The documents cited here adjust cost and tonnage figures in order to exclude metallurgical
coals, and break down cleaning and scrubber costs by region and sulfur content of the coal. See
ARMS REPORT, supra note 39, app. III, at 111-12 (differences in scrubber cost by coal sulfur con-
tent); J. Kilgroe, supra note 57 (table 15) (adjusting for metallurgical coals and regional variations);
see note 57 supra (cost figures).
63. P. 1525.
64. See p. 1524. If all utility coal east of the Mississippi not currently cleaned were to be cleaned,
the maximum additional emission reduction would be 2.37 million tons of sulfur dioxide for coal used
in 1985. See J. Kilgroe, supra note 57 (table 16). That is not an estimate of when such reductions
could be achieved. Interview with Kilgroe, supra note 46.
65. Kilgroe's April 1980 estimates and those of Versar, Inc. in May 1980, both relied upon by the
authors to support their claims for one to two million tons of additional emission reduction, see p.
1524 n.232, both assumed that all regulatory obstacles and other barriers to coal cleaning had been
overcome. Interview with Kilgroe, supra note 46 (Kilgroe was agency project officer for Versar Re-
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In actual fact, additional emission reductions from coal cleaning before
1985 are likely to be severely limited, because present excess coal-cleaning
capacity is less than twenty percent of the additional capacity needed to
clean all utility coal east of the Mississippi." Consequently, a number of
new plants will have to be built before the reductions promised by the
authors can be achieved by coal cleaning. That construction might well
delay these reductions into the 1990s, a date supported by the best recent
estimates. 7
3. Environmental Problems of Coal Cleaning
Coal-cleaning plants can cause significant air and water pollution and
disposal problems for large quantities of potentially dangerous solid
wastes." We believe that these difficulties can be controlled, but we do not
understand why the authors think so, given their gloomy view of EPA
enforcement. No reason is cited for their assumption that enforcement at
port). Substantial regulatory and market structure barriers to coal cleaning exist. See Office of En-
ergy, Minerals, and Industry, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Federal Program in Coal
Cleaning (Aug. 29, 1977) (agency study on which Randle and Kilgroe collaborated) (on file with Yale
Law Journal).
66. Interview with Kilgroe, supra note 46 (estimate of present idle capacity). Coal-cleaning capac-
ity for 1985 is currently estimated to be about 200 million tons per year for utility coal; annual utility
coal production east of the Mississippi is estimated to be about 505 million tons. See J. Kilgroe, supra
note 57 (table 16). The data base on the removal efficiencies of this estimated capacity is very thin.
Due to limited data on the effectiveness of currently installed equipment, no reliable estimates are
available on the gross sulfur removal capabilities of this equipment.
67. Interview with Gregory Wetstone, Environmental Law Institute, in Washington, D.C. (Mar.
27, 1981) (delay until 1990 for one to two million ton reduction likely, due to need for new construc-
tion and normal utility response time). Mr. Wetstone is one of the authors of G. Wetstone & P. Reed,
Institutional Aspects of Transported Pollutants: An Examination of Strategies for Addressing Long
Range Air Pollution Problems, Report to the National Commission on Air Quality (1981) (copy on
file with Yale Law Journal). According to that report, even if Congress specially authorized a coal-
cleaning requirement such as the authors advocate, "the full benefits associated with this program
may not bei;ealized until as long as 11 years after Congressional authorization," even though some air
quality benefits "may begin to accrue 3 years after passage of the authorizing legislation." Id. at 46.
These estimates are based on "past experience with comparable programs," with the following time
estimates for each step: (1) development and promulgation of regulations, one to four years; (2) state
implementation plan revisions, including a phase-in for construction delay, two to four years; (3)
source compliance, including time to upgrade old plants and build new capacity, zero to three years.
Id. at 46-47.
Mr. Wetstone believes that, for any substantial reduction, the eleven-year time frame is more realis-
tic because the three-year estimate assumes that utilities would begin construction of substantial coal-
cleaning capacity while the EPA develops regulations. Interview with Wetstone, supra. However, the
normal utility practice is to wait until the EPA has finished framing its regulations and then to begin
placing the necessary construction and equipment orders. Id. Moreover, the short time estimate as-
sumes that there would be no construction delays as a result of a sudden surge in demand for coal-
cleaning equipment. Id. In reality, some delay is likely because of shortages and other problems that
can be expected in any kind of crash program. Id.
68. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.252 (1980) (air pollution standards for new coal-cleaning plants); id. §
434.20-.25 (water pollution standards for coal-cleaning plants); EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
OF COAL CLEANING PROCESSES: TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 47-48 (Sept. 1979) (EPA Pub. No. EPA-
600/7-79-073e) (discussion of solid waste disposal problems of coal-cleaning plants).
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coal-cleaning plants will be better than the authors claim it is at power
plants. Had they been consistent in their enforcement assumptions, the
authors would not have advocated a headlong rush to coal cleaning and
reversal of the 1979 standard.
D. Visibility Protection
The authors contend that it is irrational to spend "billions of dollars"
on scrubbing in the Western states in order to protect visibility, because
air pollution from smelters will mask any changes in regional visibility,19
and because "beefed-up enforcement" and better siting will alleviate the
"plume effects" from individual plants.70
The authors' argument on regional haze problems apparently assumes
that new power plants will be concentrated in the two Western states
most strongly affected by air pollution from smelters: Arizona and New
Mexico, the homes of nine large copper smelters. In fact, most new power
plants projected to be built in the Western states, which now enjoy high
visibility, are slated for Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah, and
Wyoming,7' which currently have five smelters among them. Conse-
quently, the failure to control emissions from power plants in these states
with high visibility poses a substantially greater risk of creating regional
haze problems than the authors' discussion would indicate. 2
The authors' arguments on the use of power plant siting and enforce-
ment to alleviate plume effects also miss the mark. As previously noted,
the EPA's PSD program, mandated by the Clean Air Act, is a siting pro-
gram. A central feature of the PSD program is its stringent standards for
power plants located near national parks and wilderness areas, standards
designed to prevent adverse effects on visibility in those areas." Similarly,
increased enforcement in the West would result in little emission reduc-
tion, because EPA enforcement of power plant emission limitations is con-
siderably more effective than the authors' discussion indicates, especially
69. Pp. 1534-35.
70. P. 1534.
71. According to ICF projections, more than 70% of the new coal-fired generating capacity built
in the eight-state region by 1995 will be located in these six states. See ICF REPORT, supra note 16, at
C-III-8e to -8f (21,701 megawatts out of 29,828 megawatts of new capacity).
72. Continuation of the 1971 standard would allow power plant sulfur dioxide emissions in the
Mountain region to increase from 358,000 tons in 1975 to 1,231,600 tons in 1995. See ICF REPORT,
supra note 16, at C-I-3b. The EPA's 1979 standard reduces the 1995 level to 839,000 tons. Id. at C-
III-3b. Under either standard, most of the increases in coal-fired generating capacity and the resultant
emission increases are projected to occur outside Arizona and New Mexico, the states with the bulk of
smelter sulfur dioxide emissions.
73. See Clean Air Act §§ 162-163, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7472-7473 (Supp. 1111979) (stringent air quali-
ty standards for mandatory Class I areas, including national parks larger than 6,000 acres and na-
tional wilderness areas larger than 10,000 acres).
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when enforcement is based on scrubbers. 4
E. Dispersion Techniques
The authors advocate reductions in stack height and changes in operat-
ing regimen to concentrate sulfur dioxide emissions near power plants,
thus supposedly alleviating acid rain problems in the East and plume ef-
fects on visibility in the West.75 The result of this effort to reduce atmo-
spheric dispersion of harmful pollutants, however, would be to increase
ambient concentrations of sulfur dioxide and the depositional loads in the
area of each emitting source. Yet avoiding the adverse effects associated
with these concentrations has required the attention of Congress, the
agency, and industry over the past decade. Indeed, the authors have pro-
vided no evidence that an appreciable fraction of large sulfur dioxide
emitters currently operating or proposed for construction would be able to
use short stacks without creating serious violations of air quality standards
or without exceeding the allowable PSD increments. The PSD increments
are particularly stringent near national parks and wilderness areas in the
West.
76
Avoidance of excessive concentrations of sulfur dioxide and avoidance of
adverse depositional loads of sulfate requires either increased dispersion or
emission reductions. Section 123(b) of the Clean Air Act flatly forbids the
use of dispersion techniques in lieu of continuous emission controls.77 The
authors have failed to consider the second horn of the practical dilemma
that confronts them.
Conclusion
Our purpose in writing is limited, but highly relevant to the validity of
the authors' philosophical arguments. Much of their article attempts to
demonstrate the supposed environmental and economic irrationality of the
1979 standard the EPA adopted, thus proving the need for reversal by the
courts and Congress and the validity of the administrative law principles
they sketch. As should be apparent to the reader, our purpose is primarily
to show that serious technical and methodological problems in the case
study leave their arguments unsupported.
We have grave reservations about other aspects of the article, particu-
larly the authors' glaring lack of consideration of serious long-term supply
limitations in the low sulfur coal market, and the increasingly heavy de-
74. See pp. 1404-05 supra.
75. See pp. 1531, 1534.
76. Clean Air Act §§ 162-163, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7472-7473 (Supp. III 1979).
77. Id. § 123(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7423(b).
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mands that other industrial users are placing on this low sulfur fuel. We
also note that the authors ignored the serious effects of nitrogen oxides on
both acid rain and visibility. Space limitations prevent us from examining
these and several other serious problems, but the authors' fundamental
analytic failures make it unnecessary for us to do so in this comment.
These problems highlight our basic differences in approach. Not only
does their approach overstate problems with present strategies and tech-
nologies, but it causes them to assume that a market scheme would avoid
most of these pitfalls. Market schemes must depend on the same family of
technological and fuel options, and the same kind of enforcement person-
nel and monitoring technologies, that present rules rely on. They must
address the same complex problems of atmospheric chemistry and physics.
They must contend with the same political and economic interests in Con-
gress, the states, the affected industries, and the environmental movement.
The invocation of slogans such as "market-like schemes" alters none of
the technical, human, physical, and political realities, and is simply a
masquerade for serious analysis. Serious analysis seldom yields answers as
easy as the authors claim and, in this case, leaves their theories entertain-
ing, but unproven.
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